


DCI MISSIONS

Transferring the French Armed Forces know-how



• Cyberdefence department 2013. Over 1,000 employees located in France, Middle East, Asia and South America



TRAININGS AND EXERCISES


HOW TO FOSTER CYBER-DETECTION?

FEEDBACKS FROM 3 TRAININGS AND RELATED MEANS




CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENTS: compliance, governance & operational

CYBERDEFENSE CAPABILITIES HAVE TO BE ASSESSED in 3 LEVELS : COMPLIANCE, GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL



Cyberdefence > MULTIDIMENTION

A SOC for Active Cyberdefense, cyberLab as a resource for evaluation, training, research, benchtest, complex use cases, options evaluation for plans, etc.



Organization & processes

Functions held in the Chain of Command and Capability Resources



JFC

CYBERCOMMAND

J1

J2

HR

Intelligence

- Drives data collect from various sensors, databases, CIS, and other sources.
- Conduct further data collection for complementary information
- Cross-Analysis

J3

Current

- OPERATIONCollect technical reports
- Collaborate with Plan/J5
- Conduct operations (diagnosis, analysis, crisis tasks such hot plan, etc.)

Logistic

PLAN

J5

- Leverages surveillance
 awareness and survey to
 develop long and short-term
 plans, tailored strategy, courses
 of action, and shape execution
 of Offensive, Defensive
 Cyberspace Operations.
- Cast information to authorities

J6

CIS

- Provide all the necessary technical tools and environment.
- Platform, applications servers, links, secured networks, workshop platforms for evaluations, analysis, etc.



- Running cold plan
- Using local resources (HR & tech)

Cyber Detection

- Picture
- SIEM / Supervisor

Cyber Response

Running response operations

Cyber Prevention

- · Design Cold plan
- Schedule Local Resources (HR & tech)

Cyber Detection

- Diagnosis Design
- Views performance

Cyber Response

• Plan design: forensic, RRT task

CYBERLAB: Comprehensive environment: technical & scenario


Comprehensive target architecture: servers, active network components, settings, failures, flaw, fake events


SCENARIO


ARCHITECTURE

DOCUMENTS

ANIMATION TRAINING









EQUIPEMENTS

FRAMEWORK




SETTINGS



COMPONENTS



TRAINING






EXERCISE MEANS > OVERALL ARCHITECTURE > TO CONFIGURE FOR EACH SCENARIO



Technical support

Infrastructure Hosting

Intel, cooperation



External support

Players

pen tester, players, external roles (SCO, local

admin)

DETECTION > EXTERNAL (internet) AND INTERNAL (ioc)

CASE #1

SUB CONTRACTOR WORKING FOR MoD

EMAIL: MALWARE WITHIN THE ATTACHED FILE

CLASSIFIED FILE FOUND ON INTERNET



CRISIS CELL

 External Investigations

coordination

 Importance de la compromise

Battle Rhythm

SIEM STRIKERS

Pen testers

Splunk

Complexity

Nature • Responses


• Plan

DIFFICULTIES

Players are facing 2 ways of detection: external one and internal one. Further more, the additional external conditions (attacks from pen testers) make process more difficult

BATTLE RHYTHM: simulation of 1 day representative

Typical day sequence played in exercise, different battle rhythm to converge



DETECTION > INTERNAL (SIEM Alerts)

CASE #2

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATOR **SEVERAL ALERTS**


RECONSTRUCTIONS OF EVENTS & CORRELATION



DIFFICULTIES

Players are facing 2 days of log data Bridging with the command center

- Briefing, reports (infra, Biz, Strikes)
- Plan
- Operations




PLATFORM #3

COMPLEXITY OF PREVENTION, DETECTION BEFORE FAILURE (NEW SOURCE LOG AND ANALYSER)

DETECTION > VISUAL (SUPERVISOR, TOOL or HUMAN- TOO LATE) OR PROBE SUPERVISOR


CASE #3

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATOR
ATTACK ON THE FIRMWARE
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF EVENTS & CORRELATION




Players are facing a failure with the oil pump and inconsistence temperature (local vs remote)

Short Loop with extra source (probe)



DETECTION > COMPLEXITY > NEW SOURCES TO ANALYSE IN RISK MANAGEMENT

CASE #3




HYBRID INFORMATION:

- Temperature probe within the PLC
- Should the temperature be replaced by a dedicated probe
- How to add more information and sources?

DETECTION > COMPLEXITY > DISCOVERING NODES AND TRAFFIC

CASE #3




NEW IDS:


- What's going on ?
- · Correlation with others information

DETECTION > COMPLEXITY IN UPSTREAM PHASE (PROBE CONFIGURATION)

CASE #3

Using a traffic reference to compare the log traffic






PLATFORM #3

COMPLEXITY OF PREVENTION, DETECTION BEFORE FAILURE (NEW SOURCE LOG AND ANALYSER)


DETECTION > COMPLEXITY > UNDERSTANDING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

CASE #3 Reconstitution of the sequence of events



DETECTION > COMPLEXITY IN UPSTREAM PHASE (CONFIGURATION OF THE PROBE)

CASE #3



HOW TO CONFIGURE THE PROBE BEFORE THE MISSION

WHAT ARE THE COLD PLAN?


- · Restore firmware: when, why?
- Investigation to confirm diagnosis, How To?
 - Comparing the "Reference" of traffic and behaviour
 - Correlation with other sources of information
- Emergency measures?

HOW TO BUILD HOT PLAN?

- · Multiply the scenario operation conditions
- Enhance the Exercise with several type of scenario
- Investigation to confirm diagnosis, How To?
 - Comparing the "Reference" of traffic and the going on/past behaviour
 - Correlation with other sources of information
- Set of emergency measures (Response sheets and forms)?

DETECTION > DESIGN MODULAR ARCHITECTURE WITH A CYLAB

CASE #3





QUESTIONS